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Abstract. As cloud computing becomes prevalent, more and more sensitive infor-
mation are being centralized into the cloud. For the protection of data privacy,
sensitive data usually have to be encrypted before outsourcing, which makes effec-
tive data utilization a very challenging task. In this paper, we propose a new method
to enable effective fuzzy keyword search in a multi-user system over encrypted cloud
data while maintaining keyword privacy. In this new system, differential searching
privileges are supported, which is achieved with the technique of attribute-based
encryption. Edit distance is utilized to quantify keywords similarity and develop
fuzzy keyword search technique, which achieve optimized storage and representa-
tion overheads. We further propose a symbol-based trie-traverse searching scheme
to improve the search efficiency. Through rigorous security analysis, we show that
our proposed solution is secure and privacy-preserving, while correctly realizing the
goal of fuzzy keyword search with multiple users.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing, the new term for the long dreamed vision of computing as a utility,
enables convenient, on-demand network access to a centralized pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
deployed with great efficiency and minimal management overhead.
As cloud computing becomes prevalent, more and more sensitive information
are being centralized into the cloud, such as emails, personal health records, private
videos and photos, company finance data, government documents, etc. By storing
their data into the cloud, the data owners can be relieved from the burden of data
storage and maintenance so as to enjoy the on-demand high quality data storage
service. However, the fact that data owners and cloud server are not in the same
trusted domain may put the outsourced data at risk, as the cloud server may no
longer be fully trusted in such a cloud environment due to a number of reasons [1, 2]:
the cloud server may leak data information to unauthorized entities or be hacked.
It follows that sensitive data usually should be encrypted prior to outsourcing for
data privacy and combatting unsolicited accesses. However, data encryption makes
effective data utilization a very challenging task given that there could be a large
amount of outsourced data files [3, 4, 5, 6]. Moreover, in cloud computing, data
owners may share their outsourced data with a large number of users owning different
privileges. The individual users might want to only retrieve certain specific data files
they are interested in during a given session. One of the most popular ways is to
selectively retrieve files through keyword-based search instead of retrieving all the
encrypted files back which is completely impractical in cloud computing scenarios.
Beside this, data encryption also demands the protection of keyword privacy since
keywords usually contain important information related to the data files.
Thus, keyword privacy should also be ensured so that no unauthorized entity is
able to get any sensitive information from the search operations. All these problems
make effective data utilization and search a challenging task, especially when there
could be a large number of on-demand data users and data files.
Although allowing for performing searches securely and effectively, the existing
searchable encryption techniques do not suit for cloud computing scenario since they
support only exact keyword search. That is, there is no tolerance of minor typos
and format inconsistencies which, on the other hand, are typical user searching
behavior and happen very frequently. Such user searching behavior is especially
inevitable in cloud computing because the data owners may share their outsourced
cloud data with a large number of data users through on-demand authorization.
As common practice, users may search and retrieve the data of their respective
interests using any keywords they might come up with. Recently, Li et al. [7, 8,
9, 10] proposed a new way to enable fuzzy keyword search over encrypted data
by introducing the edit distance in the encrypted keywords. However, they have
not considered the construction in a multi-user system with differential searching
privileges. Furthermore, they can only support the direct and simple search at the
server side.
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In this paper, we propose an efficient fuzzy keyword search scheme with multi-
user over encrypted cloud data while maintaining keyword privacy and supporting
authorized search. A gram-based fuzzy keyword set is presented, which is a different
technique from the wildcard-based method [7]. Based on the constructed fuzzy
keyword sets, we further propose an advanced symbol-based trie-traverse searching
scheme, where a multi-way tree structure is built up using symbols transformed from
the fuzzy keywords. Through rigorous security analysis, we show that the proposed
solution is secure and privacy-preserving, while supporting multi-user searching with
differential privileges.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the features
of related work. Section 3 introduces the system model, threat model, our design
goal and briefly describes some necessary background for the techniques used in this
paper. Section 4 provides detailed description of our proposed schemes. Section 5
presents the security analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Traditional searchable encryption [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] has been widely
studied in the context of cryptography. Among those works, most are focused on
efficiency improvements and security definition formalizations. The first construc-
tion of searchable encryption was proposed by Song et al. [12], in which each word
in the document is encrypted independently under a special two-layered encryption
construction. Goh [13] proposed to use Bloom filters to construct the indexes for
the data files. For each file, a Bloom filter containing trapdoors of all unique words
is built up and stored on the server. To search for a word, the user generates the
search request by computing the trapdoor of the word and sends it to the server.
Upon receiving the request, the server tests if any Bloom filter contains the trapdoor
of the query word and returns the corresponding file identifiers. To achieve more
efficient search, Chang et al. [16] and Curtmola et al. [17] both proposed similar
“index” approaches, where a single encrypted hash table index is built for the entire
file collection. In the index table, each entry consists of the trapdoor of a keyword
and an encrypted set of file identifiers whose corresponding data files contain the
keyword. As a complementary approach, Boneh et al. [14] presented a public-key
based searchable encryption scheme, with an analogous scenario to that of [12]. In
their construction, anyone with the public key can write to the data stored on the
server but only authorized users with the private key can search. As an attempt to
enrich query predicates, conjunctive keyword search, subset query and range query
over encrypted data have also been proposed in [18, 20]. Note that all these exist-
ing schemes support only exact keyword search, and thus are not suitable for cloud
computing.
Private matching [21], as another related notion, has been studied mostly in
the context of secure multiparty computation to let different parties compute some
function of their own data collaboratively without revealing their data to the others.
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These functions could be intersection or approximate private matching of two sets,
etc. [22]. Private information retrieval [23] is an often-used technique to retrieve
the matching items secretly, which has been widely applied in information retrieval
from database and usually incurs unexpectedly computation complexity.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
3.1 System Model
In this paper, we consider a cloud data system consisting of data owner, data user
and cloud server. Given a collection of n encrypted data files C = (F1,F2, . . . ,FN)
stored in the cloud server, a predefined set of distinct keywords W = {w1, w2, . . . , wp}
and a set of searching privileges PS = {P1, P2, · · · , Pk}, the cloud server provides
the search service for the authorized users over the encrypted data C. We assume
the authorization between the data owner and users is appropriately done. An au-
thorized user types in a request to selectively retrieve data files of his/her interest.
The cloud server is responsible for mapping the searching request to a set of data
files, where each file is indexed by a file ID and linked to a set of keywords. The
fuzzy keyword search scheme returns the search results according to the following
rules:
1. if the user’s searching input exactly matches the pre-set keyword, the server is
expected to return the files containing the keyword;
2. if there exist typos and/or format inconsistencies in the searching input, the
server will return the closest possible results based on pre-specified similarity
semantics.
3.2 Security Model
We consider a semi-trusted server. In this work, we just consider Honest but Curious
Cloud Servers. That is to say, cloud servers will follow our proposed protocol, but
try to find out as much secret information as possible based on their inputs. More
specifically, we assume cloud servers are more interested in contents of data files
stored. A secure communication channel between users and cloud servers is required.
Users would try to access data files either within or out of the scope of their access
privilege. Two kinds of attackers are considered in this system, that is,
1. external attackers, including the server, revoked users and other unauthorized
users;
2. internal attackers who share their privileges with other users without such ones.
Even though data files are encrypted, the cloud server may try to derive other
sensitive information from users’ search requests while performing keyword-based
search over C. Thus, the search should be conducted in a secure manner that allows
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data files to be securely retrieved while revealing as little information as possible to
the cloud server.
In this paper, when designing fuzzy keyword search scheme, we will follow the
security definition deployed in the traditional searchable encryption [17]. More spe-
cifically, it is required that nothing should be leaked from the remotely stored files
and index beyond the outcome and the pattern of search queries.
We address the problem of supporting efficient yet privacy-preserving fuzzy key-
word search services over encrypted cloud data. Specifically, we have the following
goals:
1. to explore different mechanisms for constructing storage-efficient fuzzy keyword
sets;
2. to design efficient and effective fuzzy search schemes based on the constructed
fuzzy keyword sets;
3. to validate the security and evaluate the performance by conducting extensive
experiments.
3.3 Preliminaries
Edit Distance. There are several methods to quantitatively measure the string
similarity. In this paper, we resort to the well-studied edit distance [25] for
our purpose. The edit distance ed(w1, w2) between two words w1 and w2 is the
number of operations required to transform one of them into the other. The
three primitive operations are:
1. Substitution – changing one character to another in a word;
2. Deletion – deleting one character from a word;
3. Insertion – inserting a single character into a word.
Given a keyword w, we let Sw,d denote the set of words w
′ satisfying ed(w,w′) ≤ d
for a certain integer d.
Fuzzy Keyword Search. Using edit distance, the definition of fuzzy keyword
search can be formulated as follows: Given a collection of n encrypted data
files C = (F1, F2, . . . , FN) stored in the cloud server, a set of distinct keywords
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wp} with predefined edit distance d, and a searching input
(w, k) with edit distance k (k ≤ d), the execution of fuzzy keyword search re-
turns a set of file IDs whose corresponding data files possibly contain the word
w, denoted as FIDw: if w = wi ∈ W , then return FIDwi ; otherwise, if w 6∈ W ,
then return {FIDwi}, where ed(w,wi) ≤ k. Note that the above definition is
based on the assumption that k ≤ d. In fact, d can be different for distinct
keywords and the system will return {FIDwi} satisfying ed(w,wi) ≤ min{k, d}
if exact match fails.
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Trapdoors of Keywords. Trapdoors of the keywords can be realized by applying
a one-way function f , which is similar as [13, 11, 17]: Given a keyword wi and
a secret key sk, we can compute the trapdoor of wi as Twi = f(sk, wi).
Attribute-based encryption. Attribute-based encryption (ABE), which enables
public key based one-to-many encryption, where differential yet flexible access
rights can be assigned to individual users. There are two methods in crypto-
graphy to realize the fine-grained access control based on ABE: key-policy ABE
(KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [24]. CP-ABE is different
from KP-ABE in the sense that, in CP-ABE, the data owner is able to assign
certain access policy for each file. When a file is being encrypted, it will be
associated with an access structure over a predefined set of attributes. The
user will only be able to access the underlying file if his/her attributes match
the access structure specified in the ciphertext while in KP-ABE, the access
policy is bounded with each user, not with each file. Thus, we explore how
to utilize CP-ABE to manage the keys and files stored in cloud computing.
Denote ABE = (SetupABE,KeyGenABE,EncABE,DecABE) as an attribute-based
encryption scheme, where SetupABE is the setup algorithm with a predefined
security parameter, KeyGenABE is the key-issuing algorithm running by the
attribute authority, EncABE and DecABE are the encryption and decryption
algorithms, respectively.
4 CONSTRUCTIONS OF EFFECTIVE FUZZY KEYWORD
SEARCH IN CLOUD
The key idea behind our secure fuzzy keyword search is two-fold:
1. building up fuzzy keyword sets that incorporate not only the exact keywords
but also the ones differing slightly due to minor typos, format inconsistencies,
etc.;
2. designing an efficient and secure searching approach for file retrieval based on
the resulted fuzzy keyword sets.
In this section, we will focus on the first part, i.e., building storage-efficient fuzzy
keyword sets to facilitate the searching process.
4.1 Construction of Fuzzy Keyword Sets
To provide more practical and effective fuzzy keyword search constructions with
regard to both storage and search efficiency, we now propose an advanced techniques
to improve the straightforward approach for constructing the fuzzy keyword set.
Without loss of generality, we will focus on the case of edit distance d = 1 to
elaborate the proposed advanced techniques. For larger values of d, the reasoning
is similar.
Efficient Multi-User Keyword Search over Encrypted Data in Cloud Computing 729
Gram-Based Fuzzy Set Construction. The gram of a string is a substring that
can be used as a signature for efficient approximate search [26]. While gram has
been widely used for constructing inverted list for approximate string search [27,
28, 29], we use gram for the matching purpose. We propose to utilize the fact
that any primitive edit operation will affect at most one specific character of the
keyword, leaving all the remaining characters untouched. In other words, the
relative order of the remaining characters after the primitive operations is always
kept the same as it is before the operations. With this significant observation,
the fuzzy keyword set for a keyword wi with ` single characters supporting edit




all the (`–τ)-gram from wi and with the same relative order (we assume that
d ≤ `). For example, the gram-based fuzzy set SCASTLE,1 for keyword CASTLE can
be constructed as {CASTLE, CSTLE, CATLE, CASLE, CASTE, CASTL, ASTLE}. Gener-
ally, given a keyword wi with ` single characters, the size of S
′
wi,τ
is C`−τ` , and




` + · · ·+C`−d` . Compared to wildcard-based construc-
tion, gram-based construction can further reduce the storage of the index from
40MB to approximately 10MB under the same setting as in the wildcard-based
approach.
4.2 The Intuitive Solutions
The size of fuzzy keyword set is greatly reduced using the proposed techniques.
However, the above constructions introduce another challenge: How to generate the
search request and how to perform fuzzy keyword search? In the straightforward
approach, because the index is created by enumerating all of fuzzy words for each
keyword, there always exist matching words for the search request as long as the edit
distance between them is equal to or less than d. To design fuzzy search schemes
based on the fuzzy keyword sets constructed from wildcard-based or gram-based
technique, we compute the searching request regarding (w, k) as {Tw′}w′∈Sw,k , where
Sw,k = {S ′w,0, S ′w,1, · · ·, S ′w,k} is generated in the same way as in the fuzzy keyword
set construction. In this section, we will show how to achieve fuzzy keyword search
based on the fuzzy sets constructed from the proposed advanced techniques. For
simplicity, we will only consider the fixed d in our scheme designs. In this section, we
start with some intuitive solutions, the analysis of which will motivate us to develop
more efficient ones. Based on the storage-efficient fuzzy keyword set constructed as
above, we first use the traditional listing approach to realize fuzzy keyword search
supporting only one privilege and without user revocation.
Specifically, the scheme goes as follows:
1. In the index building phase, for each keyword wi ∈ W , the data owner com-
putes trapdoors Tw′i = f(sk, w
′
i) for all w
′
i ∈ Swi,d with secret key sk. Then
s/he computes Enc(sk,FIDwi‖wi) and outsources the index table {{Tw′i}w′i∈Swi,d ,
Enc(sk,FIDwi‖wi)} together with the encrypted data files to the cloud server;
2. Assume an authorized user types in w as the searching input, with the pre-set
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edit distance k. The searching input is first transformed to a fuzzy set Sw,k.
Then, the trapdoors {Tw′}w′∈Sw,k for each element w′ ∈ Sw,k are generated and
submitted as the search request to the cloud server;
3. Upon receiving the search request, the server first compares {Tw′}w′∈S′w,0 with the
index and returns the search result as Enc(sk,FIDw‖w) if there exists an exact
match. Otherwise, the server will compare all the elements of {Tw′}w′∈S′w,τ (1 ≤
τ ≤ k) with the index for the file collection and return all of the matched results
{Enc(sk,FIDwi‖wi)}.
The user now can obtain {FIDwi‖wi} through decryption and retrieve files of inter-
est.
Another solution is to explore Bloom filter [30] to represent the fuzzy keyword set
Swi,d for each keyword wi with edit distance d, namely, the trapdoor set {Tw′i}w′i∈Swi,d
is inserted into keyword wi’s Bloom filter as the index stored on the server. Now by
binding the encrypted file identifiers Enc(sk,FIDwi‖wi) to wi’s Bloom filter, a per
keyword index is generated to track the data files. Upon receiving the search request
{Tw′}w′∈Sw,k , the server tests which Bloom filters contain 1’s in all r locations for each
element w′ ∈ Sw,k and returns the search results, assuming there are r independent
hash functions h1, . . . , hr used in the construction of Bloom filter. In this solution,
the server will only need to store a bit array of m bits instead of the trapdoor
information for all fuzzy set regarding wi. Compared to the listing scheme, both
storage cost and searching cost are now O(|W |). The intuition behind this idea is
to insert fuzzy set Swi,d of all the keywords belonging to the same file into a single
Bloom filter; a search request {Tw′}w′∈Sw,k for (w, k) is conducted by testing all the
words in {Tw′}w′∈Sw,k through each file’s Bloom filter. Note that the search cost
associated with this solution is O(|N |), where N is the number of data files.
4.3 Efficient Fuzzy Searching Scheme
In this section, we show how to improve the searching efficiency in multi-user set-
ting, where a data owner stores a file collection on the cloud server and allows
an arbitrary group of users with different privileges to search over his file collec-
tion. A broadcast encryption scheme is demanded in this paper. Assume BE =
(KeyGenBE,EncBE,DecBE) is a broadcast encryption scheme providing revocation-
scheme security against a coalition of revoked users [31]. More specially, KeyGenBE
is the key generation algorithm that is used to generate a long-lived key for the
user, EncBE is the encryption algorithm that is used to encrypt files to a privi-
leged user group G. The group G can be dynamically changing, as users can be
added to or removed from G, DecBE is the decryption algorithm that is used to
decrypt the ciphertext if with a non-revoked secret key at the time the message was
encrypted.
We also need a secure symmetric encryption scheme in the following construc-
tions. Assume SE=(KeyGenSE, EncSE, DecSE) is a symmetric encryption scheme,
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where KeyGenSE is the setup algorithm with a predefined security parameter λ,
EncSE and DecSE are the encryption and decryption algorithms, respectively.
Index Building. To enhance the searching efficiency, we utilize a symbol-based
trie-traverse search scheme, where a multi-way tree is constructed for storing the
fuzzy keyword set {Swi,d}wi∈W over a finite symbol set. The key idea behind this
construction is that all trapdoors sharing a common prefix may have common
nodes. The root is associated with an empty set and the symbols in a trapdoor
can be recovered in a search from the root to the leaf that ends the trapdoor. All
fuzzy words in the trie can be found by a depth-first search. Assume ∆ = {αi}
is a predefined symbol set, where the number of different symbols is | ∆ |= 2n,
that is, each symbol αi ∈ ∆ can be denoted by n bits.
The improved fuzzy keyword search scheme works as follows:
1. Setup. Assume the data owner wants to outsource the file collection C with key-
word set W ; s/he computes Tw′i = f(skP , w
′
i) as αi1 · · ·αil/n for each w′i ∈ Swi,d
(i = 1, · · · , p) and each P ∈ PS, where l denotes the output length of one-way
function f(x), skP denotes the secret key related to the privilege P and PS
denotes the privilege set defined by the data owner. A tree GW covering all
the fuzzy keywords of wi ∈ W is built up based on symbols in ∆. For each
keyword W , the data owner determines its corresponding files {FIDi} to be
allowed to search under each eligible privilege P . The data owner encrypts F
with the symmetric encryption as C = EncSE(skP , F ). Finally, the key skP is
encapsulated with the encryption algorithm of CP-ABE under access policy P as
EncABE(P, skP ). The data owner chooses a random r and computes the broad-
cast encryption of r as C ′ = EncBE(G, r) for the authorized user group G in this
system. The data owner attaches the Enc(skP ,FIDwi‖wi) to GW . The public
parameter is then published on cloud servers so that every user can download
it.
2. New User Grant. Assuming a new user wants to join the system, the data
owner computes and sends the user a long-lived secret key of the broadcast
encryption scheme. This key is to be used in user revocation. Assume that the
user has been issued a private key skL on his/her attributes L by running the
algorithm of KeyGen(L, ·). Initially, the data owner wishes to allow users only
with specific privileges to access the data files stored in cloud servers.
3. Search. To search files containing w with edit distance k, the eligible user first
downloads the ciphertext C ′ of the broadcast encryption and decrypts to get r
because the key r currently used is encrypted in the way that only the server
and the set of currently authorized users can decrypt C ′ and get r. The user
with the attribute private key on L can decrypt and get skP if his/her attribute
list L matches the access policy P . Then, s/he computes H(r, T ′) as a message
authentication code (MAC), where T ′ is the requested trapdoor as T ′ = {TskP ,w′}
for each w′ ∈ Sw,k. The user sends T ′ = {TskP ,w′}w′∈Sw,k and H(r, T ′) to the
server. Upon receiving T ′ and its MAC, the cloud servers verify its correctness
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by using r. If it is valid, the cloud servers perform search. Specifically, the server
divides each TskP ,w′ into a sequence of symbols, performs the search over GW
and returns {Enc(skP ,FIDwi‖wi)} to the user.
4. User Revocation. Whenever there is a user ID′ to be revoked, the data owner
picks a new r′ and stores it encrypted on the cloud servers by computing
EncBE(G, r
′) such that only user set G, including the non-revoked users and
cloud servers can decrypt it. Additionally, the original encrypted value
EncBE(G ∪ ID′, r) with respect to G ∪ ID′ will be deleted. This broadcast
encryption is utilized here to prevent the user who was authorized but currently
revoked in the system.
Note that by dividing the keying hash value into l/n parts, each n-bit of the hash
value represents a symbol in ∆. The hash value of each fuzzy word w′i ∈ Swi,d
is deterministic because with the same input sk and w′i, the output αi1 · · ·αil/n
is unique. Moreover, no information about wi will be leaked from the output
αi1 · · ·αil/n . In this scheme, the paths of trapdoors for different keywords are
integrated by merging all the paths with the same prefix into a single trie to
support more efficient search. The encrypted file identifiers will be indexed
according to its address or name and the index information will be stored at
the ending node of the corresponding path. With the returned search results
{Enc(skP ,FIDwi‖wi)}, the user may retrieve the files of his/her interest after
decrypt and obtain {FIDwi‖wi}. For each request, the search costs only O(l/n)
at the server side, which has nothing to do with the number of files or the size
of related keywords.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the correctness and security of the proposed fuzzy keyword
search schemes. At first, we show the correctness of the schemes in terms of two
aspects, that is, completeness and soundness.
Theorem 1. The scheme satisfies both completeness and soundness. Specially,
upon receiving the request of w, all of the keywords {wi} will be returned if and
only if ed(w,wi) ≤ k.
The proof can be derived based on the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The intersection of the fuzzy sets Swi,d and Sw,k for wi and w is not
empty if and only if ed(w,wi) ≤ k.
Proof. First, we show that Swi,d ∩ Sw,k is not empty when ed(w,wi) ≤ k. To
prove this, it is enough to find an element in Swi,d ∩ Sw,k. Let w = a1a2 · · · as and
wi = b1b2 · · · bt, where all these ai and bj are single characters. After ed(w,wi) edit
operations, w can be changed to wi according to the definition of edit distance.
Let w∗ = a∗1a
∗
2 · · · a∗m, where a∗i = aj or a∗i = ∗ if any operation is performed at this
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position. Since the edit operation is inverted, from wi, the same positions containing
wildcard at w∗ will be performed. Because ed(w,wi) ≤ k, w∗ is included in both
Swi,d and Sw,k, we get the result that Swi,d ∩ Sw,k is not empty.
Next, we prove that Swi,d ∩ Sw,k is empty if ed(w,wi) > k. The proof is given
by reduction. Assume there exists an w∗ belonging to Swi,d ∩ Sw,k. We will show
that ed(w,wi) ≤ k, which reaches a contradiction. First, from the assumption that
w∗ ∈ Swi,d ∩ Sw,k, we can get the number of wildcards in w∗, which is denoted
by n∗, is not greater than k. Next, we prove that ed(w,wi) ≤ n∗. We will prove the
inequality with induction method. First, we prove it holds when n∗ = 1. There are
nine cases which should be considered: If w∗ is derived from the operation of deletion
from both wi and w, then, ed(wi, w) ≤ 1 because the other characters are the same
except the character at the same position. If the operation is deletion from wi and
substitution from w, we have ed(wi, w) ≤ 1 because they will be the same after at
most one substitution from wi. The other cases can be analyzed in a similar way
and are omitted. Now, assuming that it holds when n∗ = γ, we need to prove it also
holds when n∗ = γ + 1. If ŵ∗ = a∗1a
∗
2 · · · a∗n ∈ Swi,d ∩ Sw,k, where a∗i = aj or a∗i = ∗.
For a wildcard at position t, cancel the underlying operations and revert it to the




are derived from them, respectively. Then perform one operation at position t of w∗i
to make the character of wi at this position be the same with w, which is denoted
by w′i. After this operation, w
∗
i will be changed to w
∗, which has only k wildcards.
Therefore, we have ed(w′i, w) ≤ γ from the assumption. We know that ed(w′i, w) ≤ γ
and ed(w′i, wi) = 1, based on which we know that ed(wi, w) ≤ γ + 1. Thus, we can
get ed(w,wi) ≤ n∗. It renders the contradiction ed(w,wi) ≤ k because n∗ ≤ k.
Therefore, Swi,d ∩ Sw,k is empty if ed(w,wi) > k. 2
The following theorem says that in the gram-based search schemes, the satisfied
keywords will be returned, as well as some keywords which are not desired. To be
concrete, the returned keywords may also include keyword wi as the answer for the
request of (w, k) even if ed(w,wi) > k. For example, to search with the request
(CAT, 1), the keyword CASTLE will be returned if (CASTLE, 3) is stored in the index,
even if the edit distance of CAT and CASTLE is greater than 1. Thus, with the
returned results, the user should filter the keyword set by further computing the
edit distance.
Theorem 2. The gram-based fuzzy keyword search schemes satisfy the complete-
ness. Specially, upon receiving the request of (w, k), all of the keywords wi will be
returned if ed(w,wi) ≤ k.
The proof of the theorem can be obtained through the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Assume Swi,d and Sw,k are built with edit distance d and k for wi and
w, respectively. The set Swi,d ∩ Sw,k is not empty when ed(wi, w) ≤ min{d, k}.
Proof. Let ed(w1, w2) = d, after at most d operations on the characters of w1,
it can be transformed to w2. Without loss of generality, assume |w1| ≥ |w2|. It
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means that the remaining |w1| − d characters in w1 are untouched and they are
equal to a (|w1|−d)-character sequence in w2, which belongs to Sw1,k1 ∩Sw2,k2 when
d ≤ min{k1, k2}. 2
Theorem 3. The fuzzy keyword search schemes are secure regarding the search
privacy.
Proof. In the gram-based scheme, the computation of index and request of the same
keyword is identical. Therefore, we only need to prove the index privacy by using
reduction. Suppose the searchable encryption scheme fails to achieve the index
privacy against the indistinguishability under the chosen keyword attack, which
means there exists an algorithm A which can get the underlying information of
keyword from the index. Then, we build an algorithmA′ that utilizesA to determine
whether some function f ′(·) is a pseudo-random function such that f ′(·) is equal
to f(sk, ·) or a random function. A′ has access to an oracle Of ′(·) that takes as
input secret value x and returns f ′(x). Upon receiving any request of the index
computation, A′ answers it with request to the oracle Of ′(·). After making these
trapdoor queries, the adversary outputs two challenge keywords w∗0 and w
∗
1 with
the same length and edit distance, which can be relaxed by adding some redundant
trapdoors. A′ picks one random b ∈ {0, 1} and sends w∗b to the challenger. Then,
A′ is given a challenge value y, which is either computed from a pseudo-random
function f(sk, ·) or a random function. A′ sends y back to A, which answers with
b′ ∈ {0, 1}. Suppose A guesses b correctly with non-negligible probability, which
indicates that the value is not randomly computed. Then, A′ makes a decision that
f ′(·) is a pseudo-random function. As a result, based on the assumption of the
indistinguishability of the pseudo-random function from some real random function,
A at best guesses b correctly with approximate probability 1/2. Thus, the search
privacy is obtained. 2
Theorem 4. The fuzzy keyword search schemes are secure regarding the search
authorization.
Proof. To prove the security against the users with unauthorized search, we need to
prove that, given access to a set of encrypted data, the attackers are not able to learn
any partial information about the underlying trapdoors of any keyword. Recall that
there are three kinds of attackers here: 1) cloud servers; 2) revoked users; 3) users
with unmatched attributes.
• For revoked users, it is easy to prove the security because they cannot get new r′
encrypted by the broadcast encryption with respect to eligible users; thus, they
cannot generate valid trapdoor.
• For cloud servers, they have not attribute private key on any attribute set; that
is, they cannot get any information of the secret key used in the symmetric
encryption. Therefore, they are not able to decrypt and get any information of
the underlying files if the symmetric encryption is secure.
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• For users whose attributes do not match the access policy, they cannot get the
underlying secret key used in the symmetric encryption. As a result, they cannot
decrypt to get the files though they have r′.
• If they collude, based on the security of the original ABE, it already has been
designed to prevent from such attack.
Based on the above analysis, the key point of the security proof is the underlying
fine-grained ABE. We only need to prove that the ABE will not leak information
of the underlying message. The formal definition and secure scheme has been given
in [24], which is called indistinguishability against chosen message attack. More
specially, after setup of the system and uploading of the data, the adversary submits
some queries to retrieve the attribute private keys. Finally, A cannot distinguish if
a ciphertext is an encryption to which one of two adaptively chosen messages under
some chosen access policy. 2
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, the fuzzy keyword search in a multi-user system with differential
privileges is addressed. We formalized and solved the problem of supporting efficient
yet privacy-preserving fuzzy search for achieving effective utilization of remotely
stored encrypted data in cloud computing. We utilized the gram-based technique to
construct the storage-efficient fuzzy keyword sets by exploiting the similarity metric
of edit distance. Based on the constructed fuzzy keyword sets, we further proposed
a brand new symbol-based trie-traverse searching scheme, where a multi-way tree
structure is built up using symbols transformed from the resulted fuzzy keyword
sets. Through rigorous security analysis, we showed that our proposed solution is
secure and privacy-preserving, while correctly realizing the goal of fuzzy keyword
search.
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